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Credit Risk of Financial Institutions 
 
Abstract 
Although there is substantial literature on credit risk, studies often do not consider 
financial institutions. However, considering that several entities are exposed to these 
institutions, namely through the counterparty role that they play, it is of major relevance 
the accurate assessment of its credit risk. As such, this study aims at analysing three 
different models to measure credit risk of financial institutions and conclude which one 
best predicts credit rating downgrades. The three models studied comprise a credit 
scoring model; a naïve approach of the Merton (1974) Model; and CDS spreads. The 
results show that all three models are statistically significant to predict credit rating 
downgrades of financial institutions, though the latter two prove to better and more 
timely anticipate downgrades than the credit scoring model. 
 




In the scope of an internship at the Risk Management unit of the Sociedade Gestora 
dos Fundos de Pensões do Banco de Portugal (SGFPBP), Banco de Portugal’s pension 
funds’ managing company, this thesis compares different models to forecast credit risk 
of financial institutions and concludes which one best predicts credit rating transitions. 
The purpose behind this study is to apply the model with best predictive power to 
the financial counterparties of the SGFPBP, in order to control and mitigate the credit 
risk that doing business with financial institutions poses. The control and prediction of 
potential credit rating downgrades is of major importance to the SGFPBP, as it is 
subject to strict guidelines regarding the credit quality of the counterparties to which it 
is exposed. Therefore, if any of the models analysed in this paper proves to have good 
predictive power, it would allow for anticipated actions to lessen credit risk exposure, or 
even to avoid non-compliance with the investment guidelines. 
There is credit risk literature dating back to 1968, when Edward Altman published 
his paper presenting the broadly known Z-Score Model. However, with the 2008 global 
financial crisis, awareness about credit risk rose considerably for corporations around 
the world. Nevertheless, existing and renamed credit risk literature is much more 
focused on bankruptcy prediction rather than on prediction of firms’ credit quality 
deterioration. Moreover, there is a lack of literature analysing the performance of credit 
risk models applied to financial institutions. 
In this sense, this work project fills the gap by analysing three different credit risk 
models and their predictive power over credit rating downgrades, using a sample of fifty 
large financial institutions. Using ten years of panel data, from 2003 to 2012, logit 
regressions are computed, where the regressand is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever 
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there is a downgrade from the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) rating agency, and equal to 0 
otherwise; the independent variables are the “probabilities of default” calculated 
through the credit scoring model and the naïve approach of the Merton (1974) Model, 
and the CDS spreads from the third model analysed. 
From the McFadden R-squareds of the regressions computed and the power curves 
of the models, presented in a later section of this report, all three models statistically 
significantly predict credit rating downgrades, though the credit scoring model does not 
anticipate them, as the other two models do. 
This project is organised as follows. First, section 2 provides a brief literature 
review on credit risk, more specifically, on state-of-the-art models that are crucial to 
implement the models analysed in this work project. 
Section 3 explains in detail the three models analysed: a credit scoring model, using 
a similar approach as the one used by Campbell, Hilscher, & Szilagyi (2006); a naïve 
approach of the Merton (1974) Model, suggested by Bharath & Shumway (2008); and, 
finally, a simpler model based on credit default swap (CDS) spreads. This third section 
is divided in two parts: first, the methodology used for each of the three models is 
carefully described; and secondly, the results are presented and analysed. 
Finally, section 4 summarises the main aspects and conclusions of this study, its 
limitations, and ends with some suggestions for further research. 
2. Literature Review 
Credit risk literature is mostly about bankruptcy prediction and has grown 
significantly in recent years following the 2008 financial crisis. However, some models 
still remain widely used, despite having been developed many years ago. Important 
examples are the Z-Score Model of Altman (1968) and the Merton (1974) Model. 
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The credit scoring model developed by Altman (1968), broadly known as the “Z-
Score Model”, is probably the first major contribution for credit risk literature. The 
author proposes a discriminant model, including five statistically significant financial 
ratios to predict corporate bankruptcy. After obtaining this score for a sample of 
manufacturing firms, the author concludes that all the companies with a Z-Score lower 
than 1.81 fall into the bankruptcy group, while companies with Z-Scores higher than 
2.99 correspond to the non-bankruptcy group. Z-Scores in-between correspond to the 
“zone of ignorance”, though the author then concludes that the value that best separates 
both groups is 2.675. 
The relevance of this model led several other authors to further develop this 
approach, and even the author revisited its original model some years later (Altman, 
Haldeman, and Narayanan, 1977), proposing an alternative seven-variable model: 
“ZETA Model”, which they proved to be more effective in forecasting bankruptcy for 
2-5 years horizons. More recently (Altman, 2000), the author extended its analysis of 
both models to non-publicly-traded and non-manufacturing companies. 
It is also worth mentioning the work developed by Ohlson (1980), who proposed a 
logit model, using four variables measuring the size of the firm, its financial structure, 
performance, and liquidity, to forecast bankruptcy of industrial companies. 
The logit model used by this author is also used by Campbell, Hilscher, & Szilagyi 
(2006). These authors compute probabilities of default for different horizons, using the 
bankruptcy indicator proposed by Chava & Jarrow (2004). Unlike the previously 
mentioned models that almost only rely on accounting information, this alternative 
approach also includes market information; a relevant add-in that may improve the 
accuracy of credit risk assessment, as it better and more timely reflects the behavioural 
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sentiment of investors towards a given company. This is one of the models analysed in 
this work project, and is therefore explained in more detail in the next section. 
Another relevant contribution for the credit risk literature is proposed by Merton 
(1974). This author proposes a market-based model for pricing corporate bonds that 
allows for credit risk measurement; where the market value of equity is considered a 
call option on the firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of its debt. 
The Merton (1974) Model is also crucial to the development of Moody’s KMV 
credit risk model. This model applies the results achieved by Merton (1974) to compute 
the “Expected Default Frequency” (EDF), which can be interpreted as a probability of 
default. Other relevant reference is Bharath & Shumway (2008), in which the Merton 
and Moody’s KMV approaches are compared and a similar, but naïve, alternative is 
suggested. Nevertheless, given the good results reported by the authors, when compared 
to the other two models, this is the second model analysed in this work project. 
Besides the credit risk models aforementioned, it is also important to refer the use of 
CDS spreads to measure credit risk. Particularly, the third model analysed in this work 
project uses CDS spreads as an equivalent measure to probabilities of default, as they 
represent the market price of credit risk protection from a given company. Therefore, a 
significant increase in a firm’s CDS spread signals deterioration of its credit quality, 
which might in turn anticipate a rating downgrade. In short, in a CDS contract, the 
protection buyer pays a premium (CDS spread) to the protection seller, in order to be 
insured if a credit event occurs, in which case the seller has to compensate the 
protection buyer for the loss incurred. 
This risk metric is also studied by Das, Hanouna, & Sarin (2008), who argue that 
CDS spreads allow for a continuous analysis of credit and recovery risk that other 
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models using default binary variables do not allow, and defend that they reflect market 
information more accurately than credit rating agencies. 
In their study, the authors compare the performance of accounting and market-based 
variables in the pricing of default risk, measured by CDS spreads. They conclude that 
both types of information are complementary in pricing credit default swaps and prove 
that CDS spreads and credit ratings have a negative relationship, meaning that higher 
spreads correspond to lower ratings. Nonetheless, all these results are achieved using a 
sample of non-financial institutions; therefore, this will also be analysed for this work 
project’s sample, in order to confirm whether these conclusions hold for financial firms. 
3. Discussion of the Topic 
3.1. Methodology 
This section presents the methodology adopted for each of the models analysed. For 
the credit scoring model (Model 1) and the naïve Merton (1974) Model (Model 2), a 
sample of fifty banks (Appendix 1) retrieved from the MSCI World Index is used. For 
the CDS spreads model (Model 3), since there is no CDS historical data available for all 
the companies, only 34 out of the 50 firms presented in Appendix 1 are considered. 
The firms are chosen by merging the fifty banks with biggest weights in the index in 
2003 and 2012. The reasoning behind this is to eliminate survivorship bias from the 
sample, and also because it is important to include some banks that were more affected 
by the 2008 global crisis (or even that went bankrupt or were acquired by other firms). 
Whenever possible, monthly data from the beginning of 2003 until the end of 2012 
is used to test the models. In what concerns accounting variables, annual data is used, as 
there is no quarterly data available for all the period analysed (2003-2012). Moreover, a 
lag of three months from the correspondent fiscal date of each firm is imposed, since 
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this data is not immediately known by the market. Therefore, this has to be taken into 
account so as not to incur in a forward-looking bias. 
Regarding credit ratings, required for the explained variable of the models, the series 
of rating transitions’ dates are drawn from Bloomberg, and based on the S&P long-term 
foreign currency ratings. All the data used in this study are retrieved from Bloomberg. 
The first model analysed (Model 1) is based on a paper by Campbell, Hilscher, & 
Szilagyi (2006). The authors apply a dynamic logit model (equation (1)), where the 
explained variable is the probability of a firm entering bankruptcy or failure (   ) in   
months, assuming it survived until      . This probability is explained by a set of 
explanatory variables ( ) including both accounting and equity market data. 
     (                       )   
 
                   
 (1) 
In this work project, instead of the probability of default, the dependent variable is 
the probability of a rating downgrade, meaning that     when a firm is downgraded 
by S&P, and     otherwise. Concerning explanatory variables (matrix   in equation 
(1) above), the ones included in this project are the same as those used by Campbell, 
Hilscher, & Szilagyi (2006) (Appendix 2). 
Regarding accounting data, four indicators are considered: profitability, leverage, 
liquidity and market-to-book ratio. Profitability is computed as the ratio between net 
income and a proxy for the market value of total assets (total book value of liabilities 
plus the market value of equity). Leverage is the ratio between total liabilities and the 
market value of total assets. Liquidity is obtained by dividing cash and short-term assets 
by the market value of assets. Finally, the market-to-book ratio is directly retrieved from 
Bloomberg, and is the firm’s market capitalisation divided by the book value of assets. 
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Concerning market information, four variables are included in the regression: the 
natural logarithm of 1 plus the excess return of each firm over the S&P 500 (     
          )]); the three-month standard deviation of daily natural log stock returns; the 
natural log of the ratio of each firm’s market capitalisation over the benchmark index 
(S&P500) market capitalisation; and finally, the natural log of each firm’s stock price. 
After having all the inputs for the explanatory variables, the same coefficients 
(matrix β in equation (1) above) as those computed by Campbell, Hilscher, & Szilagyi 
(2006) (Appendix 2) are applied to the independent variables in the regression. 
It is important to understand that the coefficients estimated by Campbell, Hilscher, 
& Szilagyi (2006) that are used in this study are the ones that correspond to a 12-month 
lag, meaning that the probabilities computed represent the likelihood of a bank being 
downgraded in one year, conditional on its survival in the following eleven months. 
Having the monthly “probabilities of default” for a ten-year period, calculated with 
a similar approach as those used by Campbell, Hilscher, & Szilagyi (2006), the next 
step is to verify whether this model is significant to explain credit rating downgrades. 
As such, a logit regression using panel data is computed, where the explained 
variable is the binary variable of downgrades, and the “probability of default” calculated 
through equation (1) is the explanatory variable. The reason for using a logit regression 
is that the dependent variable is binary and the function follows a logistic distribution. 
This type of distribution has a similar shape to that of the normal, despite its heavier 
tails; a characteristic that frequently increases the robustness of the results delivered by 
this function, when compared to a function that follows a normal distribution (probit). 
The results delivered by the logit regression report a p-value of 0.00 for the 
coefficient of the independent variable and an adjusted McFadden R
2
 of 3.18% 
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(regression (1) in Appendix 3), meaning that the predictor used in the regression is 
statistically significant to explain credit rating downgrades. 
The second credit risk model analysed in this study (Model 2) follows the naïve 
approach of the Merton Distance to Default Model (Merton, 1974), presented in a paper 
by Bharath & Shumway (2008). In this paper, the authors propose a naïve alternative to 
the Merton (1974) Model, which uses the same functional form, but computes the 
probability of default of a given firm through much simpler calculations. 
Given the authors’ conclusion that the naïve approach outperforms the Merton 
(1974) Model, though it still captures the same information and functional form, this 
work project applies the naïve model proposed by the authors to the sample of financial 
firms under analysis, and tests if this indicator significantly explains rating downgrades. 
Similarly to Model 1, this model also considers accounting and market variables to 
compute the probability of default of a given company. Regarding accounting data, the 
inputs used are current liabilities and long-term debt; concerning market variables, 
monthly stock returns and the market capitalisation of the company are required. 
First, the market value of debt ( ) is assumed to be equal to its face value ( ), 
which is computed as the total value of current liabilities (  ) plus one-half of long-
term debt (   ) (equation (2)); an approach also suggested by Vassalou & Xing (2004). 
                    (2) 
Second, debt volatility (  ) is calculated as in equation (3); where    is the annual 
standard deviation of each firm’s monthly stock returns over the previous 12 months. 
                      (3) 
With this, total volatility of each company’s market value of assets is calculated as 
in equation (4), where   is the equity market value of each firm (market capitalisation). 
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    (4) 
Then, to obtain the distance to default, the only input missing is the expected return 
on the firm’s assets ( ); which is considered to be the cumulative monthly stock return 
over the previous year (     ) (equation (5) below). 
              (5) 
Finally, the naïve distance to default (DD) can be computed: 
        
  (
   
 )  
                   
    
         √  
 (6) 
It is important to highlight that the Merton (1974) Model commonly assumes    , 
which corresponds to a forecasting horizon of 1 year. Herein this is also assumed, as the 
objective is to predict credit rating downgrades in a 1-year horizon. 
By computing the cumulative standard normal distribution function of the 
symmetric value of the naïve distance to default (equation (7) presented below), the 
naïve probability of default (PD) is obtained. 
                     (7) 
Once again, in this study, the purpose of computing this credit risk metric is to 
predict downgrades; therefore, similarly to what is done with Model 1, a logit regression 
is computed, where the dependent variable is the downgrade binary variable and the 
explanatory variable is the naïve probability of default computed through equation (7). 
The results deliver a p-value of 0.00 for the coefficient of the explanatory variable 
and an adjusted McFadden R
2
 of 13.12% (regression (2) in Appendix 3), considerably 
larger than the value for Model 1 (3.18%). 
Finally, the third model consists in testing whether credit default swap spreads 
explain credit rating downgrades. Since the buyer of a CDS is buying credit protection 
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from a given company, the price he pays represents the risk of an institution suffering a 
credit event. Therefore, historical monthly ask prices on each company’s senior debt, 5-
year CDS contracts, are gathered. 
After retrieving this data, a logit regression is computed, where the explained 
variable is the downgrade binary and the explanatory variable is the series of CDS 
spreads. The results, presented in Appendix 3 (equation (3)), report a p-value of 0.00 for 
the explanatory variable, meaning that CDS spreads statistically significantly predict 
rating downgrades, for any significance level. The adjusted McFadden R
2
 obtained is of 
5.26%; higher than that of Model 1 and lower than the adjusted pseudo-R
2
 of Model 2. 
3.2. Results 
From the first three regressions presented in Appendix 3 it is possible to conclude 
that all the models analysed statistically significantly explain credit rating downgrades, 
given their p-value of 0.00. From the McFadden R-squareds of the simple regressions, 
the model that better explains downgrades is Model 2, with an adjusted pseudo-R
2
 of 
13.12%, while Model 1 appears to be the model with worst goodness of fit, with an 
adjusted McFadden R
2
 of 3.18%. 
Given the significance of all the models, other regressions, with all the possible 
combinations of the three models, were also analysed. In Appendix 3, one can see that 
by inputting Models 1 and 2 as explanatory variables (regression (4)), both of them 
remain significant for any conventional significance level. The same happens when 
joining Models 1 and 3 (regression (5)), and Models 2 and 3 (regression (6)). In fact, 
through the adjusted McFadden R
2
 analysis, the two-model combination that better 
explains credit rating downgrades is the one comprising Models 1 and 2, with an 
adjusted McFadden R
2
 of 14.30%. 
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Looking at the correlation matrix presented in Appendix 4, one can also see that the 
three models present a low correlation with each other, with Models 1 and 2 registering 
a correlation coefficient of only 0.1286; Models 2 and 3 have the highest correlation, 
with a coefficient of 0.4862. Given this, one could actually expect each of the models to 
add supplementary information to each of the other models; a result supported by the 
statistical significance of the two-models multiple regressions. 
As such, another multiple regression including the three models is computed 
(regression (7) in Appendix 3), and the results show that Model 3 becomes statistically 
insignificant for any conventional significance level, given its coefficient p-value of 
0.1035. With this, from the regressions computed and its results, one would conclude 
that the best combination of models is the one that includes Models 1 and 2. 
Nonetheless, additional analyses are performed. In Appendix 5 the power curves, 
also known as Cumulative Accuracy Profiles (CAP curves), of the three models are 
presented. The power curves are broadly used for comparing credit risk models, as they 
depict, at each point, the Y percentage of total defaults, or in this case downgrades, that 
correspond to the X% riskiest observations in the sample. For example, a point in the 
graph where X=10% and Y=50%, means that 50% of the total observations that 
correspond to a downgrade are assigned to the 10% riskiest observations in the sample. 
The CAP curve is constructed as follows. First, the observations are ranked from the 
riskiest to the less risky, where the riskiest observation is the one with the highest credit 
risk indicator or “probability of default” computed by each model. Then, the proportion 
of downgrades that took place up to each point in the rank is computed, as well as the 
correspondent percentage of observations considered. The 45º line depicted in the graph 
corresponds to the arbitrary case in which scores are randomly assigned. 
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Therefore, the best model should be the one further from the random CAP line, 
meaning that, the larger the area between the model power curve and the 45º line, the 
better. Given this, an adaptation of the Gini coefficient that allows the calculation of the 
area between each model’s CAP curve and the 45º line was computed for the three 
models. The results report coefficients of 0.48, 0.61 and 0.71, for Models 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively. This delivers the conclusion that, according to the power curves, the best 
model to anticipate credit rating downgrades is Model 3, followed by Model 2. The first 
model appears to have the worst predictive power; a conclusion that somehow 
contradicts the results previously discussed for the regressions in Appendix 3. 
The contradictory conclusions achieved through the R
2
 analysis and the CAP curves 
may be explained by the fact that these two indicators have different interpretations. On 
the one hand, R-squareds indicate which model best predicts the explained variable, in 
this case, downgrades. In the case of the McFadden R
2
, it is relevant to note that results 
can only be used for comparison purposes, meaning that the R
2
 value alone cannot be 
interpreted as the percentage of the dependent variable explained by the independent 
variables; it can only be used to compare with R-squareds from other regressions, so 
that the highest R
2
 corresponds to the model that best predicts the outcome. 
On the other hand, power curves indicate the Y% of downgrades that correspond to 
the X% riskiest observations in the sample. This means that, the higher the percentage 
of downgrades that correspond to the lowest percentage of riskiest observations in the 
sample, the better. In short, the best model is the one that captures the highest number of 
downgrades in the first riskiest observations. 
In this work project, the objective is not to use the results provided by the models at 
each point in time to predict whether there will be a downgrade or not; what matters the 
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most is the evolution of the models. Therefore, we want that the riskiest observations 
provided by each model correspond to the moments when there is a rating downgrade, 
which is what the power curves report. 
In order to make a more illustrative analysis, it was also considered relevant to 
present some graphical examples of companies that were more affected by the 2008 
financial crisis, to see how the credit risk models analysed performed in these specific 
cases and whether they timely anticipated credit rating transitions. 
As such, the graphics presented below illustrate the models studied and the credit 
rating transitions in the period analysed, subject to each company’s available data. Each 
model’s credit risk indicator is represented in the left vertical axis and is constrained so 
that each model’s maximum corresponds to 100. Therefore, the values depicted do not 
represent the “probabilities of default” computed by Models 1 and 2 or the CDS spreads 
from Model 3; they are just indexes obtained from the original models. 
In Figure 1 below, the Lloyds Banking Group case is presented. One can see that the 
downgrades take place in January and March of 2009 and in November 2011.  In late 
2008 the global financial crisis was in its peak and financial institutions were struggling 
with increasing losses and, at the same time, tighter capital requirements that they were 
not able to fulfil. In this period, several banks had to receive Government aid, which 
was the case of Lloyds in October 2008. In fact, from Figure 1 one can see that the 
models started signalling a credit risk increase in mid-2007, with Model 2 registering 
the more evident increase. In mid-2009 these indicators decreased considerably, but 
then increased again prior to the third downgrade. Model 1 appears to be the one 




Figure 2 below shows the case of Wachovia, which started registering losses in the 
second quarter of 2008, in the height of the financial crisis. After a turbulent period of 
losses and with several clients withdrawing money from the institution, Wachovia was 
forced to be sold, and ended up being acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008. In the graph 
below one can see Models 2 and 3 signalling a credit risk increase in mid-2007, while 
Model 1 only shoots after the first downgrade, in July 2008. 
From this example it is also relevant to observe that prior to the first downgrade, 
Wachovia was upgraded twice. In fact, Model 3 suggests an improvement in credit 
quality, though the decrease in the indicator is much less pronounced than when there is 
credit risk deterioration. This might suggest that the credit risk indicators analysed are 
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Figure 1 - Lloyds Banking Group 
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Figure 2 - Wachovia 
























Figure 3, presented below, shows the most iconic case of the global financial crisis. 
In 2008 Lehman Brothers Holdings started registering unprecedented losses and in 
September 2008 filed for bankruptcy through Chapter 11. Again, Models 2 and 3 start 
increasing sharply in early 2007, while the first downgrade only takes place in June 
2008 and then the firm defaults three months later. As in the previous example, Model 1 
only reacts when the company defaults. 
 
Figure 4 below depicts Allied Irish Banks (AIB), one of the biggest Irish banks that 
had to be intervened by the Government as a result of the financial crisis. In February 
2009 the Irish Government announced a €7 billion rescue package for AIB and then, in 
December 2010, it had to take a majority stake in the bank. While this bank went into 
deeper trouble in 2008, Figure 4 shows that the credit risk indicators obtained from 
Models 2 and 3 start increasing sharply in late 2007, while the first downgrade only 
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Figure 3 - Lehman Brothers Holdings 
















The graphical analysis performed helps understanding better the behaviour of the 
credit risk models studied. From the examples presented, one can see that Model 1 only 
reacts when the credit rating downgrades take place, while Models 2 and 3 start reacting 
much earlier, suggesting that these models are better to anticipate credit quality 
deterioration of financial institutions. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that, from the 
graphical analysis, Model 3 appears to be more volatile than Model 2, as in several 
situations it increases and decreases significantly without any credit rating change 
happening later; while Model 2 only increases prior to credit rating changes and its 
increase is much more sustained than that of Model 2. Another relevant remark is that 
the models are more reactive to credit quality deteriorations than to credit quality 
improvements, as the variation in the indicators is much less pronounced in this case. 
Another important contribution of this work project is that it only includes financial 
institutions in the sample, contrary to most of the literature on credit risk. For instance, 
in the studies developed by Bharath and Shumway (2008) and by Das, Hanouna and 
Sarin (2008), that are referred in this work project, the authors exclude financial firms 
from their sample. Therefore, this work project concludes that the naïve approach of the 
Merton (1974) Model and the CDS spreads also analysed by Das, Hanouna, Sarin 
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Figure 4 - Allied Irish Banks 












The results of this work project provide some interesting, though not unanimous 
conclusions. From the regressions computed with the three models analysed, it appears 
that all of them statistically significantly predict credit rating downgrades. However, 
from the logit multiple regression including the three models, Model 3 appears not to 
have additional predictive power when combined with Models 1 and 2. On the other 
hand, from the power curves presented, Model 3 outperforms the other two models. 
Nonetheless, it is also important to mention some of the limitations of this study. 
First, the sample considered only includes large, global banks, where some of them are 
financial counterparties of the SGFPBP. A sample including smaller banks might have 
yielded different results. However, the sample was limited to large banks since they 
have similar characteristics to the financial counterparties of the SGFPBP. 
In what concerns Model 1, which, from the graphical examples presented, seems to 
be the one anticipating downgrades later, it is relevant to mention that when computing 
the probability of an institution being downgraded in one year, as stated in equation (1), 
section 3.1., the explanatory variables’ coefficients ( ) applied were the ones provided 
by Campbell, Hilscher, & Szilagyi (2006). However, it would be more accurate to 
estimate these coefficients using the sample of financial firms analysed in this study. 
Regarding Model 2, it is important to refer that the naïve alternative proposed by 
Bharath & Shumway (2008) is too simplistic when compared to the Merton (1974) 
Model. When applying both models to other sample, different conclusions could have 
been achieved. Therefore, this comparison could have been applied to the sample of 
financial firms considered, to verify whether the naïve alternative still outperforms the 
Merton (1974) Model in predicting credit rating downgrades of financial institutions. 
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Concerning Model 3, this is a much simpler and limitative model, when compared 
to the previous two, as not all the companies included in the initial sample have CDS 
contracts or historical data available on their prices, which reduced significantly the 
observations for this model. Moreover, lack of data was more common in smaller banks 
(compared to the sample’s median size), which might create a bias regarding firm size. 
Overall, the three models studied proved to be significant in predicting credit rating 
downgrades, and more important, they appear to anticipate credit quality deterioration 
considerably early, except for Model 1. This suggests the usefulness of these models to 
monitor credit risk in addition to credit ratings, that instead of anticipating credit risk 
deterioration, in many situations, companies are only downgraded when the situation is 
already severe. Notwithstanding, companies all over the world usually rely on these 
ratings to assess companies’ credit quality and make investment decisions, when other 
credit risk indicators, such as the ones presented in this study might better and more 
timely reflect credit risk. A good example of this is that during the 2008 financial crisis 
several A-rated companies went bankrupt, and credit rating agencies did not anticipate 
this, while the models presented here did. 
Moreover, it is relevant to observe that credit rating changes became much more 
frequent after the 2008 financial crisis. This is illustrative by saying that, for the sample 
of fifty financial institutions analysed, until the end of 2007 (first five years of the 10-
year sample), there are only four observations corresponding to downgrades, while if 
the last five years (2008-2012) are considered, there are 83 observations corresponding 
to downgrades. This fact did not allow for an out-of-sample analysis that would be 
another suggestion for improving this study. If a larger database had been used, an out-
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Appendix 1 – Sample of fifty financial institutions used for testing all the models 
analysed (for Model 3 only the companies identified with “*” were included). 
1* HSBC Holdings PLC 26* Deutsche Bank AG 
2* Wells Fargo & Co 27 Bank of Montreal 
3* JPMorgan Chase & Co 28 Itaú Unibanco Holding SA 
4* Bank of America Corp 29* Capital One Financial Corp 
5* Citigroup Inc. 30* Bank of China Ltd 
6* Commonwealth Bank of Australia 31* Lloyds Banking Group PLC 
7 Royal Bank of Canada 32* Sberbank of Russia 
8* Westpac Banking Corp 33 Banco Bradesco SA 
9* Banco Santander SA 34 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
10 Toronto-Dominion Bank 35 PNC Financial Services Group Inc. 
11* Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 36* Credit Suisse Group AG 
12* Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. 37 Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC 
13 Bank of Nova Scotia 38* Wachovia Corp 
14* Standard Chartered PLC 39 Keycorp 
15* US Bancorp 40* Danske Bank A/S 
16* National Australia Bank Ltd 41* Svenska Handelsbanken 
17* Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 42* Dexia 
18 China Construction Bank Corp 43 Comerica Inc. 
19* UBS AG 44* Swedbank AB 
20* BNP Paribas SA 45 Fifth Third Bancorp 
21* Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 46 National City Corp 
22* Barclays PLC 47 SunTrust Banks Inc. 
23* Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc. 48* Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
24 ICBC 49* Allied Irish Banks PLC 





Appendix 2 – Logit regression on 12-months lagged best-model variables, where the 
dependent variable is failure (binary variable equal to 1 if a firm files for bankruptcy, 
delists or receives a D rating, and 0 otherwise), according to Campbell, Hilscher, & 
















































Appendix 3 – Output for the logit regressions of the downgrade binary variable on the 
“probabilities of default” from Models 1 and 2, and the CDS spreads from Model 3.  
Explanatory Variable 
Logit Regressions (Explained Variable: Downgrade Binary) 



















































 0.0341 0.1335 0.0558 0.1476 0.0751 0.1444 0.1593 
Adjusted McFadden R
2
 0.0318 0.1312 0.0526 0.1430 0.0687 0.1380 0.1497 
Total Observations 5708 5679 3363 5679 3294 3283 3283 
Observations with Dep=1 83 83 63 83 63 63 63 
P-values in parentheses 
* Coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% significance level 
All the regressions presented include data from January 2003 until December 2012 (10 years of monthly data) 
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Appendix 4 – Correlations matrix for the three models analysed. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 1  1.0000  0.1286  0.2895 
Model 2  0.1286  1.0000  0.4862 
Model 3  0.2895  0.4862  1.0000 
 
Appendix 5 – Power curves for the three models analysed. The Y axis represents the 
percentage of observations that correspond to a downgrade and that are included in the 
X% top riskiest observations, from the ranked-by-risk observations of each model. 
 
 
Appendix 6 – Variables, formulas and respective Bloomberg tickers used to compute 
all the inputs for Model 1. 
Variable Formula Bloomberg Variables and Tickers 
Profitability 
          




- Market Value of Total Assets 
                        




                 





                          
                            
 - 
- Cash and Short-Term Assets 
                   
                    
BS_CASH_NEAR_CASH_ITEM 
BS_MKT_SEC_OTHER_ST_INVEST 
Market-to-Book Ratio (Directly retrieved from Bloomberg) MARKET_CAPITALIZATION_TO_BV 
Log Excess Return Over S&P 500 
                       
             ] 
PX_LAST 
3-Months Standard Deviation (Directly retrieved from Bloomberg) VOLATILITY_90D 
Market Capitalisation vs. S&P 500   (
                            
                            
) CUR_MKT_CAP 







0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 45º Line
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Appendix 7 – Variables, formulas and respective Bloomberg tickers used to compute 
all the inputs for Model 2. 
Variable Formula Bloomberg Variables and Tickers 
Market Value of Debt 
(naïve ) 
                        
                                      
- 
- Current Liabilities 
                       
                               
BS_ST_BORROW 
BS_OTHER_ST_LIAB 
- Long-Term Debt 
                      
                              
BS_LT_BORROW 
BS_OTHER_LT_LIABILITIES 
Volatility of Debt (  )                              
- Equity Volatility (  ) 
                                       
                      √   
PX_LAST 
Total Volatility 
of the Firm (  ) 
      
             
    
      
             
    - 
- Equity (Directly retrieved from Bloomberg) CUR_MKT_CAP 
Return on Firm’s Assets ∏                              
 
    
   PX_LAST 
Distance to Default (  ) 
  (
   
 
)                     
    
         √  
 - 
Probability of Default             - 
 
Appendix 8 – Bloomberg description of all the variables used to compute the inputs for 
Models 1 and 2, mentioned in Appendices 7 and 8; for the CDS spreads from Model 3; 
and for the credit rating transitions assigned by the S&P rating agency. 
Bloomberg Ticker Bloomberg Description 
NET_INCOME 
Net Income (Losses) 
The profits after all expenses have been deducted. 
BS_TOT_LIAB2 
Total Liabilities 
= Customers' Acceptances and Liabilities + Total Deposits + ST Borrowings + Other ST 
Borrowings + Securities Sold with Repurchase Agreements + LT Borrowings + Other LT 
Liabilities 
CUR_MKT_CAP 
Total Current Market Value 
Total current market value of all of a company's outstanding shares stated in the pricing 
currency. 
BS_CASH_NEAR_CASH_ITEM 
Cash and Near Cash 
Includes cash in vaults and non-interest earning deposits in banks. 
Includes receivables from the central bank and postal accounts. 
Includes cash items in the process of collection and unposted debits. 
Interest bearing deposits in other banks are included in interbank assets. 
Includes statutory deposits with the central bank. 
BS_MKT_SEC_OTHER_ST_INVEST 
Marketable Securities and 
Other Short-Term Investments 
Includes trading securities and securities held for sale. 
Includes loans and mortgage-backed securities held for sale. 
Includes treasury bills. 
May include short-term interest-bearing loans to third parties if not disclosed separately.  
If disclosed separately, such loans are classified in Other Current Assets. 
Includes holdings of gold and silver. 
Excludes interest and dividends accrued which are shown in other assets. 
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Appendix 8 – Bloomberg description of all the variables used to compute the inputs for 
Models 1 and 2, mentioned in Appendices 7 and 8; for the CDS spreads from Model 3; 
and for the credit rating transitions assigned by the S&P rating agency. 
Bloomberg Ticker Bloomberg Description 
MARKET_CAPITALIZATION_TO_BV 
Market Capitalisation to Book Value 
Measure of the relative value of a company compared to its market value. 
PX_LAST 
Security Last Price 
Equities: Returns the last price provided by the exchange. 
Equity Indices: Returns either the current quote price of the index or the last available 
close price of the index. 
VOLATILITY_90D 
90-Days Volatility 
Measure of the risk of price moves for a security calculated from the standard deviation of 
day to day logarithmic historical price changes. The 90-day price volatility equals the 
annualized standard deviation of the relative price change for the 90 most recent trading 
days closing price, expressed as a percentage. 
BS_ST_BORROW 
Short-Term Borrowings 
Includes bank overdrafts, short-term debts and borrowings, repurchase agreements (repos) 
and reverse repos, short-term portion of long-term borrowings, current obligations under 
capital (finance) leases, current portion of hire purchase creditors, trust receipts, bills 
payable, bills of exchange, bankers acceptances, interest bearing loans, and short term 
mandatory redeemable preferred stock. Net with unamortized premium or discount on 
debt and may include fair value adjustments of embedded derivatives. 
For banks and financials, includes call money, bills discounted, federal funds purchased, 
and due to other banks or financial institutions. 
BS_OTHER_ST_LIAB 
Other Short-Term Liabilities 
Other current liabilities that do not bear explicit interest such as accrued expenses, accrued 
interest payable. 
Includes the liability side of customers' acceptance liabilities. 
Includes fair value adjustments to derivatives and insurance policies. 
BS_LT_BORROW 
Long-Term Borrowings 
All interest-bearing financial obligations that are not due within a year. 
Includes convertible, redeemable, retractable debentures, bonds, loans, mortgage debts, 
sinking funds, and long-term bank overdrafts. 
Excludes short-term portion of long term debt, pension obligations, deferred tax liabilities 
and preferred equity. 
Includes subordinated capital notes. 
Includes long term hire purchase and finance lease obligations. 
Includes long term bills of exchange and bankers acceptances. 
May include shares issued by subsidiaries if the group has an obligation to transfer 
economic benefits in connection with these shares. 
Includes mandatory redeemable preferred and trust preferred securities in accordance with 
FASB 150 effective June 2003. 
Includes other debt which is interest bearing. 
Net with unamortized premium or discount on debt. 
May include fair value adjustments of embedded derivatives. 
BS_OTHER_LT_LIABILITIES 
Other Long-Term Liabilities 
This field includes all other long-term obligations that do not bear explicit interest. 
Includes provision for charges and liabilities, pension liabilities, retirement allowance 
accounts, deferred tax liabilities, and discretionary reserves. 
Long-term pension assets disclosed as a negative on the liability side are netted with Other 
LT liabilities. 
Includes provision for general banking risks. Includes insurance reserves for banks that 
are also active in the insurance sector. 
PX_ASK 
Last Price 
Lowest price a dealer will accept to sell a security. 
RTG_SP_LT_FC_ISSUER_CREDIT 
S&P Credit Rating 
Standard & Poor’s long-term foreign currency issuer credit rating. 
 
